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Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618

Supreme Court of the United States

1969

 

Chapter

6

Title

Implied Fundamental Rights

Page

803

Topic

Right to travel is a fundamental right

Quick Notes

Various states required their residents to live within the state for one year before they were eligible to receive state welfare benefits. The Supreme Court struck down the law as a violation of equal protection.

 

Rule

o         Under Equal Protection a State may not grant or deny welfare benefits to its residents based upon the amount of time the residents have lived within its borders.

o         State residency requirements which infringe upon "fundamental" rights violate equal protection.

 

Importance

o    The issue is that when state government creates classifications that serve to penalize the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review.

 

Right to Travel - Fundamental Right

o    This "right to travel" (or, a better way of putting what is usually being litigated, this "freedom of interstate migration") is not explicitly given by any one constitutional provision. But the Court has nonetheless treated the right as "fundamental."  Consequently, when a state treats newly-arrived residents significantly less favorably than those who have lived in the state longer, strict equal protection scrutiny may be triggered.

 

Justice Brennan - Classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement

o    Its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.

o    Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.

 

Dissent Chief Justice Warren

o    Congress has authorized the States to impose residence requirements.

o    Therefore, the question before us should have been framed in terms of whether Congress may create minimal residence requirements, not whether the states acting alone, may do so.

o    Certainly, Congress, through the states, may impose these residence requirements pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.

Book Name

Constitutional Law : Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, Tushnet.  ISBN:  978-0-7355-7719-0

 

Issue

o         Whether a state may impose a one-year residency requirement on its residents before permitting them to apply for state benefits?  No.    (Can imposed for things like divorce and college tuition).

 

Procedure

Trial

o         United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which struck down statutes denying public benefits to residents of a state or District of Columbia who had not resided in the jurisdictions for at least a year preceding their applications for assistance. The ruling was premised on a finding that the statutes restricted the exercise of a fundamental right based on an impermissible classification.

Supreme

o         Judgments holding statutory provisions unconstitutional were affirmed where respondents had a constitutional right to travel from one state to another and the challenged laws, which penalized the exercise of that right based on an impermissible classification, were unconstitutional where they were not necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.

 

Facts/Cases

Discussion

Key Phrases

Rules/Laws

Pl -   Shapiro

Df -   Thompson

 

Description

o          A State or District of Columbia statutory provision which denies welfare assistance to residents who have not resided within their jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance.

o         On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist -- food, shelter, and other necessities of life.

 

Justice Brennan

o         This scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination denying equal protection of the laws.

o         The interests which appellants assert are promoted by the classification either may not constitutionally be promoted by government or are not compelling governmental interests.

 

Appellate Arg - Waiting period is a protective device against an influx of indigent newcomers

o         Primarily, appellants justify the waiting-period requirement as a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs.

o         It is asserted that people who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence in a State are likely to become continuing burdens on state welfare programs.

o         Therefore, the argument runs, if such people can be deterred from entering the jurisdiction by denying them welfare benefits during the first year, state programs to assist long-time residents will not be impaired by a substantial influx of indigent newcomers.

 

Court - Constitutionally Impermissible

o         The purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible.

o         The need of the first year may be the most acute.

 

Court - The right to travel

o         The nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.

 

Court - If purpose is to chill, then the law is unconstitutional.

o         A law has "no other purpose . . . than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional."

 

Court - Severe impact

o    Furthermore, what was being denied to newly-arrived residents was something of extreme importance - welfare aid "upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist - food, shelter, and other necessities of life."

 

Appellants Arg - Discourage those that are entering solely to obtain larger benefits

o         Appellants argue that even if it is impermissible for a State to attempt to deter the entry of all indigents, the challenged classification may be justified as a permissible state attempt to discourage those indigents who would enter the State solely to obtain larger benefits.

 

Court - A State cannot fence out indigents

o         A State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally.

o    But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others factors, the level of a State's public assistance

 

Appellants argue - Distinguishes between new and old residents

o         The challenged classification may be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes.

 

Court - Bar new residents from schools, parks, libraries, police protection, etc

o         Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens.

o         The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.

 

Court - invidious classification between classes of citizens

o         A State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.

o         Skinner holds any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.

 

Appellant argue that the requirement

(1)   facilitates the planning of the welfare budget;

o    Court:  There is no evidence that the State of DOC uses the on-year requirement as a means to predict the number of people who will require assistance in the budget year.

(2)   provides an objective test of residency;

o    Court:  Will not withstand scrutiny.  Less drastic means are available to learn the facts upon which to determine whether the applicant is a resident

(3)   minimizes the opportunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction; and

(4)   encourages early entry of new residents into the labor force

 

 

Court - Classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement

o    Its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.

o    Under this standard, the waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.

 

Dissent - Chief Justice Warren

 

Congress created the requirement, not the States

o    Whether Congress may create minimal residence requirement, not whether States, acting alone may do so?

o    Congress has burdened the right to travel with safety regulations.

 

In this case - Travel is not prohibited

o    Any burden inheres solely in the fact that a potential welfare recipient might take into consideration the loss of welfare benefits for a limited period of time if he changes his residence.

 

Rules

Rule

o         Under Equal Protection a State may not grant or deny welfare benefits to its residents based upon the amount of time the residents have lived within its borders.

o         State residency requirements which infringe upon "fundamental" rights violate equal protection.

 

 

Class Notes